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Non-state actors lie at the heart of international cultural law. While states have been 
traditionally considered to be the subject of international cultural law, non-state 
actors—including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational 
corporations, minorities, indigenous groups and local communities, armed groups 
and even individuals— have increasingly expanded their role.2 Indeed, according to 
some scholars, ‘human beings are becoming the primary international legal persons.’3  
 
Private actors have essentially played a dual role in international cultural law: on the 
one hand, they can (and have) contribute(d) to the development of international 
cultural law, influencing its creation, implementation and enforcement.4 At the same 
time, however, non-state actors can also negatively affect the protection of cultural 
heritage, for example by damaging or destroying monuments and sites. Therefore, 
the actions of non-state actors can both elicit the goals and strengths of international 
cultural law, and embody the borders and limits of the field.  
 
When considering the positive contribution of non-state actors to international 
cultural law, it is clear that far from being mere addressees of international cultural 
law, private actors can (and have) enhance(d) the protection of cultural heritage 
through investing in its recovery and exhibition. Furthermore, non-state actors have 
                                                 
1 Professor of International Economic Law (Lancaster University). An earlier version of this article 
was presented at the International Law Association British Branch Spring Conference, held at 
Lancaster University on 8–9 April 2016, at the University of Strathclyde on 12 October 2016 and at 
the University of Newcastle on 6 April 2017. The author wishes to thank Kara and Judy Carter, Elisa 
Morgera, Francesco Sindico, James Summers, Saskia Vermeylen, and the participants at the 
conferences for their comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. The research leading 
to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European 
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2 Philip R. Trimble, ‘Globalization, International Institutions and the Erosion of National Sovereignty 
and Democracy’ (1997) 95 Michigan Law Review 1944, 1946 (noting that ‘In the past, international law 
concerned itself mostly with states … Now it increasingly concerns itself with private person[s], 
including multinational corporations … and it deals with subjects that traditionally were treated as 
purely domestic matters’.) 
3 See generally Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law 
(CUP 2016). 
4 Duncan B. Hollis, ‘Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the 
Retention of State Sovereignty’ (2002) 25 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 235, 236 
(highlighting that private actors ‘exercise increasing influence in the creation, implementation, and 
enforcement of international norms’). 
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enacted elements of cultural law and/or contributed to their adoption. For example, 
the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and other NGOs 
have adopted a number of instruments concerning the protection of monuments.  
 
If adjudication is considered to be a mode of governance, the expanding role of 
private actors in cultural heritage-related disputes has significantly contributed to the 
development of international cultural law. Private actors often file claims against 
states for the recovery of cultural property looted in times of war or for the violation 
of cultural entitlements before human rights courts and tribunals. In addition, 
private actors have filed admiralty claims to establish titles to sunken vessels, upon 
which, states have in turn asserted public-property and sovereign-immunity defenses. 
Foreign investors may also file claims against the host state alleging that the state’s 
cultural policies amount to disguised discrimination or an indirect expropriation of 
an investment. Such disputes present a mixture of private and public interests, which 
at times coincide (i.e., the mutual protection of a cultural item), and at times conflict 
(i.e., the clash of private economic or cultural interests with collective cultural or 
economic entitlements).5 
 
Beyond their positive contributions, the role of non-state actors in international 
cultural law also highlights the borders and limits of the field. Non-state actors 
formally remain a peripheral subject of international cultural law, while states remain 
at its epicentre.6 Although the protection of cultural heritage can benefit individuals, 
local communities, and the international community as a whole, in certain cases, an 
excessive protection of cultural heritage can lead to scarce consideration (if any) of 
local communities’ needs. Anthropologists argue that the traditional notion of 
conservation privileges the physical protection of cultural heritage, separating 
cultural heritage from its everyday context and its interaction with local 
communities. Anthropologists have referred to this decontextualization and 
dehumanisation of cultural heritage as ‘heritagisation of culture’.7 Moreover, non-
state actors often do not consider themselves bound by international law. Their 
expanding role in the damage and destruction of cultural heritage challenges the 
traditional way in which state-centric organisations such as the United Nations have 
responded to international crises, and call for new and more effective approaches. 
For example, international cultural law often lacks dedicated dispute settlement and 
effective enforcement mechanisms, and the violations of cultural rights often do not 
receive the same condemnation as do those of other human rights.  
  
This chapter explores the expanding role of non-state actors in the evolution of 
international cultural law, examining and critically assessing the challenges and 
opportunities offered by the participation of such actors. The chapter posits that 
non-state actors play a dual role in the development of international cultural law. On 
the one hand, non-state actors can be a force for good, fostering the evolution and 
strength of international cultural law. On the other hand, they can negatively affect 
the protection of cultural heritage, unless dedicated steps are taken to minimise such 
risks.  
                                                 
5 Joseph L. Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures (University of 
Michigan Press 1999) 197–98. 
6 Hollis, ‘Private Actors in Public International Law’, 237 (noting that ‘states remain at the epicenter 
of international law’). 





The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the main features of international 
cultural law. Second, it examines the expanding role of private actors in the making 
and evolution of international cultural law, particularly addressing the question of 
whether non-state actors can be a force for good. Third, the chapter lists the specific 
risks that non-state actors can pose to the protection of cultural heritage. It then 
discusses the sociology of international cultural law, and subsequently scrutinises 
certain critical areas of international law in which the interaction between states and 
non-state actors results in clashes. Finally, the chapter concludes with suggestions of 
how to gradually rethink the field.  
 
 
1. Global Cultural Governance  
 
Cultural governance has come of age. Once the domain of elitist scholars and 
practitioners, cultural governance—defined as the multi-level, multi-polar and 
polyphonic regulation of cultural heritage—has emerged as a new frontier of study 
and has come to the forefront of legal debate.8 This section examines the features of 
global cultural governance, with a particular focus on its rule-making and 
enforcement processes. 
 
Cultural governance is both vertically and horizontally fragmented. Cultural 
governance is vertically multi-level in nature, as different layers of regulations 
enacted at different levels—international, regional and national—can conflict and/or 
overlap.9 It is also multi-polar, as a number of different bodies—ranging from 
international administrative bodies to private actors—govern cultural heritage. 
Moreover, cultural governance is also horizontally fragmented, as these regulations 
often have different legal objects of protection, such as world heritage, intangible 
cultural heritage or cultural diversity, among others. The lack of a priori coordination 
can therefore result in gaps in the overall protection of cultural heritage.  
 
A leading role in cultural governance has been played by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).10 UNESCO was 
formed in the aftermath of WWII  due to the rising awareness ‘that a peace based 
exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments’ would 
not long endure.11 Therefore, the organisation’s mandate is ‘to build peace in the 
minds of men’ through the wide diffusion of culture and education.12 To do so, 
UNESCO has elaborated a critical mass of cultural law instruments, including 
conventions, non-binding but influential declarations, and guidelines, which have 
gradually extended the scope of cultural heritage law. UNESCO’s law-making has 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Barbara T. Hoffmann (ed.), Art and Cultural Heritage – Law, Policy and Practice (CUP 2006); 
James A.R. and Ann M. Nicgorski (eds.) Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of Conquest, Colonization and 
Commerce (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
9 See Jean-Baptiste Harelimana, La defragmentation du droit international de la culture: Vers une Cohérence des 
norms internationals (L’Harmattan 2016) (proposing methods for defragmenting international cultural 
law). 
10 UNESCO Constitution, London, 16 November 1945, in force on 4 November 1946. 4 UNTS 275 
(1945). 




raised awareness of the importance of heritage protection and spurred the 
development of regional and domestic cultural policies.13  
 
UNESCO rule-making is characterised by its interdisciplinary perspective. Not only 
lawyers and/or political scientists have contributed to the drafting of the travaux 
préparatoires of UNESCO instruments; rather, archaeologists, architects and engineers 
have participated as well. Furthermore, even the academic literature investigating 
cultural governance is interdisciplinary, often representing diverse professional 
expertise, even within the legal field. It is not uncommon for cultural heritage law 
scholars to practice different areas of law, such as private law, commercial law, 
intellectual property law, international law and EU law. 
         
As rule-making in the cultural field ‘has not been matched by a corresponding 
development of enforcement procedures and mechanisms’,14 many cultural heritage-
related disputes have been adjudicated by borrowed fora, i.e., courts or tribunals 
established within other branches of law. In fact, ‘no general court exists or is being 
considered in the field of cultural heritage’.15 Therefore, cultural heritage disputes 
have been adjudicated through a variety of mechanisms, including diplomatic efforts, 
negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial proceedings. Given the 
structural imbalance between the vague and nonbinding dispute settlement 
mechanisms provided by international cultural law instruments and the highly 
effective and sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms available under other 
branches of international law, cultural heritage disputes have often been brought 
before various fora.16 A number of courts and tribunals have adjudicated heritage-
related disputes, such as national courts, human rights courts, regional and 
international economic courts and the traditional state-to-state fora such as the 
International Court of Justice or inter-state arbitration. The existence of highly 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms in other areas of international law, 




2. The Role of Non-state Actors  
 
Private actors play a dual role in international cultural law.17 That is, they can be both 
a positive or negative force affecting the protection of cultural heritage. This section 
                                                 
13 See generally Abdulqawi A. Yusuf (ed.), Standard-Setting in UNESCO, Normative Action in Education, 
Science and Culture (vol. I) (UNESCO 2007). 
14 Francesco Francioni and James Gordley, ‘Introduction’, in Francesco Francioni and James Gordley 
(eds.) Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law (OUP 2013) 1–5, 1–2 (providing ‘a multi-level 
analysis of the possible approaches to the enforcement of international cultural heritage law.’). 
15 Id. 2. 
16 See Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration (CUP 2014) 129–
134 (considering the role of international investment law as a tool for the enforcement of cultural 
heritage law); Federico Lenzerini, ‘The Role of International and Mixed Criminal Courts in the 
Enforcement of International Norms Concerning the Protection of Cultural Heritage’, in Francioni 
and Gordley (eds.) Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law, 40–64 (considering international 
criminal law as a tool for the enforcement of cultural heritage law). 
17 Alessandro Chechi, ‘Non-State Actors and Cultural Heritage: Friends or Foes?’ in Elena Rodríguez 
Pineau and Soledad Torrecuadrada García–Lozano (eds.) Bienes Culturales y Derecho (Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid 2015) 457–479, 460 (arguing that non-state actors ‘can be regarded, at the same 
time, as “defenders” and “enemies” of cultural heritage.’) 
6 
 
illuminates the opposing roles that non-state actors play with regard to the 
protection of cultural heritage. 
 
A.    Risks: Various Types of Iconoclasm 
 
As previously stated, non-state actors can affect the protection of cultural heritage by 
damaging or destroying monuments and sites. This sub-section examines the 
destructive force of certain types of non-state actors. In particular, it uses the notion 
of iconoclasm as a useful conceptual tool encompassing a broad range of actions, 
including damage and destruction.18 Three types of iconoclasm can be identified – 
religious iconoclasm, political iconoclasm and economic iconoclasm – depending on 
the prevailing motives driving the iconoclasts.19 Although the boundaries between 
these three types are rather fluid, the notion of iconoclasm is a useful working tool 
or heuristic device for legal analysis.  
 
Religious iconoclasm is driven by religious considerations. Religion-related 
arguments against images and works of arts include the notion that the divine cannot 
be confined, nor can it be represented in material form; and that devotion to images 
can prevent or divert real devotion to the sacred through venerating the image itself, 
rather than what it represented. Aniconism—the absence of figurative elements in 
art—characterises several religions.20 In addition, prudish iconoclasm—destruction 
or material transformations of artworks due to prudery—has not been uncommon 
throughout history.21 Examples of religious iconoclasm to date include the 16th 
century Reformers such as Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) and John Calvin (1509–
1564), who considered religious images as forms of idolatry.22 During this period, the 
Iconoclastic Fury ravaged Europe, destroying religious icons, monuments and 
paintings.23 More recently, in 2001, the Taliban destroyed two massive Buddha 
statues in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Valley, considering non-Islamic art a symbol of 
idolatry.24 This type of iconoclasm has recently resurfaced in the Middle East and 
North Africa as armed groups have damaged and or destroyed shrines, ancient 
manuscripts and archaeological sites in addition to engaging in a parallel illicit trade 
                                                 
18 See Stacy Boldrick, ‘Introduction: Breaking Images’, in Stacy Boldrick, Leslie Brubaker, Richard S. 
Clay (eds.), Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Asghate 2013) 1, 2. 
19 See Jens Braarvig, ‘Iconoclasm: Three Modern Cases’, in Kristine Kolroud, and Marina Prusac 
(eds.) Iconoclasm from Antiquity to Modernity (Ashgate 2014), 153–170 (distinguishing three types of 
iconoclasm: 1) religious iconoclasm; 2) ideological iconoclasm; and 3) economic iconoclasm). 
20 See James Noyes, The Politics of Iconoclasm: Religion, Violence and Culture (I.B. Tauris, 2013) (noting that 
iconoclasm has been a formative feature of both Christian and Islamic history, crossing the 
boundaries of religion, culture and politics’). On aniconism in Islamic art, see Oleg Graba, ‘From the 
Icon to Aniconism: Islam and the Image’ (2003) 55 Museum 46–53 (noting that Islamic art discourages 
figurative art but that some images have found their way in the same). See also Proceedings of the Doha 
Conference of ‘Ulama on Islam and Cultural Heritage December 30–31, 2001 (UNESCO 2005) 19–20 
(addressing the question as to whether non-islamic heritage is entitled to preservation in Islamic 
cultures and answering in the positive).  
21 See Louis Réau, Histoire du Vandalisme: Les monuments détruits de l’art français, Tome I, Du haut moyen âge 
au dix-neuvième siècle (Hachette, 1959), at 21, quoted by Lauren Dudley, ‘A Timeless Grammar of 
Iconoclasm?’ (2014) Journal of Art Historiography 1, 5. 
22 See Carlos M.N. Eire, War against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin (CUP, 
1989) (noting that the Reformed tradition excluded images from churches considering them 
idolatrous and stressed the inability of the material world to represent the spiritual world.) 
23 See e.g. David Freedberg, Iconoclasm and Painting in the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1566–1609 (Garland, 
l988). 
24 R. Bernbeck, ‘Heritage Void and the Void as Heritage’ (2013) Archaeologies 526, 529–532 (arguing 
that the destruction of the Buddhas was due to Kulturpolitik rather than religious reasons).  
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in antiquities.25 While the UNESCO Director General described such destruction as 
a ‘crime against culture’,26 the response of international law to acts of deliberate 
destruction of cultural heritage remains unsettled. 
 
Political iconoclasm is ideologically motivated and constitutes a dimension of 
broader political violence.27 Modern examples of political iconoclasm include the 
destruction of religious images during the French Revolution, and the destruction of 
cultural artifacts in China and Tibet as part of the Cultural Revolution.28 Some 
iconoclastic acts can exist between political and religious iconoclasm and express 
both types of violence. For example, some scholars have interpreted Taliban 
iconoclasm as a political act, despite the religious arguments formally adduced for 
the destruction of the Buddhas.29   
 
Today, an additional and significant form of iconoclasm exists: economic 
iconoclasm, which is the inexorable destruction of cultural sites as a result of yielding 
to economic development needs.30 Economic iconoclasm is driven by economic 
motivations, emphasising economic values over cultural values.31 While economic 
interests have often prevailed over cultural concerns, the destruction of cultural 
objects for accumulating wealth has reached an unprecedented scale in recent years. 
Landscape is increasingly restructured along neoliberal visions.32 Furthermore, urban 
development, foreign investments, and economic globalisation undeniably transform 
societies and landscapes.33 The more economically valuable the site, the greater the 
political pressure against protecting it.34 Cultural sites, therefore, can and have 
become a battlefield between conservationists and developers.35 
 
                                                 
25 Marina Lostal and Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, ‘The Bamiyazation of Cultural Heritage and the 
Silk Road Economic Belt: Challenges and Opportunities for China’, (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of 
Comparative Law 329 , 334 (reporting the destruction of ancient manuscripts in Mali and  the 
devastation of the heritage belonging to the Sufi religious minority in Libya); Id. 336 (reporting the 
destructions of archaeological sites of Nimrud and Hatra in Iraq and Palmyra in Syria and the parallel 
illicit trade in antiquities.) 
26 Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini, ‘The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and 
International Law’ (2003) 14 EJIL 619, 621. 
27 See generally Andrew Herscher, Violence Taking Place – The Architecture of the Kosovo Conflict (Stanford 
University Press 2010) (discussing the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage during the conflict in 
Kosovo). 
28 Rodney Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches (Routledge 2003) 177; Braarvig, ‘Iconoclasm – Three 
Modern Cases’, 166 (discussing the destruction of Tibetan heritage). 
29 Finbarr Barry Flood, ‘Between Cult and Culture: Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm, and the Museum’ 
(2002) 84 The Art Bulletin 641, 653 (interpreting Islamic iconoclasm as ‘a form of protest against 
exclusion from an international community’).  
30 Braarvig, ‘Iconoclasm: Three Modern Cases’, at 153. See James Noyes, ‘Iconoclasm in the 
Twentieth century: Machines, Mass Destruction and Two World Wars’, in Stacy Boldrick, Leslie 
Brubaker and Richard Clay (eds) Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Ashgate 2013) (calling 
economic iconoclasm ‘industrialized iconoclasm’ and discussing the relationship between industrial 
progress and iconoclasm). 
31 Braarvig, ‘Iconoclasm: Three Modern Cases’,  at 153–154. 
32 Liew Kai Khiun and Natalie Pang, ‘Neoliberal Visions, Post-capitalist Memories: Heritage Politics 
and the Counter-Mapping of Singapore’s Cityscape’ (2015) 16 Ethnography 331, 332. 
33 Id. at 334. 
34 Susan Marsden, ‘Heritage as Politics’ (2011) 3 Flinders Journal of History and Politics (discussing the 
Southern Australian experience). 
35 Id. at 3 (reporting this criticism and noting developers have compared conservationists, historians 
and heritage experts to ‘extremists’). 
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Despite their varying driving motives, the different types of iconoclast acts share a 
common denominator: the struggle for power. Iconoclasm is deeply linked to 
cultural politics, which can be defined as the relationship between culture and 
power.36 Heritage, for example, is a matter of political choices about what 
communities choose to remember.37 The presence of cultural and religious 
minorities can complicate local heritage politics.38 There is a risk that the majoritarian 
rule disproportionately affects the heritage of cultural and religious minorities, thus 
potentially affecting their cultural entitlements. Moreover, iconoclasm arguably 
epitomises the clash of civilisations, which is the hypothesis that people’s cultural 
and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War 
world.39 In short, iconoclasm is ultimately led by a combination of religious, political 
and economic interests.40 
 
B.    Opportunities: Non-State Actors as a Force for Good  
 
Private funding is necessary to recover and protect cultural heritage. The fact that 
some aspects of cultural heritage governance have been privatised has arisen as a 
subject of fierce criticism by art historians, who warn again overemphasising the 
economic dimension of heritage.41 Nevertheless, the need for cooperation between 
the private and public sectors is particularly evident in times of economic crisis.42 
Private companies can sponsor the protection of cultural heritage and/or provide 
funding for conservation and protection. Indeed, private museums, dealers and 
auction houses are the ‘driving force of international art trade’.43 
 
Private actors have increasingly contributed to the making, monitoring and 
implementation of international cultural law. For example, the International Council 
of Museums (ICOM) has produced self-regulatory instruments, guidelines and codes 
providing guidance to the relevant members—texts that are of crucial importance in 
the sector.44 ICOM has also established an International Observatory on Illicit 
Traffic in Cultural Goods, to ‘serve as a permanent international cooperative 
platform and network between international organisations, law enforcement 
                                                 
36 Daniel Chandler and Rod Munday, ‘Cultural Politics’, A Dictionary of Media and Communication 
(Oxford University Press 2011) (Defining cultural politics as ‘the issue, and study, of relationships 
between culture, subjectivity, ideology, and power: including issues of race, class, and gender.’). 
37 Rodney Harrison (ed.) Understanding the Politics of Heritage (Manchester University Press, 2010) 
(discussing the political roles of heritage). 
38 For discussion, see e.g. Masha Halevi, ‘Contested Heritage: Multilayered Politics and the Formation 
of the Sacred Space — The Church of Gethsemane as a Case Study’ (2015) 58 The Historical Journal 
1031–1058 (discussing the political conflicts and national needs and interests which influenced the 
rebuilding of a sanctuary in Jerusalem). 
39 On the alleged clash of civilizations, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? (Simon & 
Schuster 1996).  
40 Braarvig, ‘Iconoclasm: Three Modern Cases’, at 154 (noting that although religious, political and 
cultural iconoclasm constitute useful ‘heuristic devices’, in practice each of the three types of 
iconoclasm ‘is linked to the other two.’) 
41 See Salvatore Settis, Italia S.p.A (Einaudi 2002). 
42 See ‘Italy PM calls on Businesses to Fund Pompeii Repairs’, BBC News, 4 March 2014. 
43 Chechi, ‘Non-State Actors and Cultural Heritage: Friends or Foes?’, 460. 
44 See ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, adopted in 1986 and revised in 2004, available at  
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Codes/code_ethics2013_eng.pdf  (last visited on 
11 October 2016) (setting minimum standards of professional practice and performance for museums 
and their staff.) 
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agencies, research institutions and other external expert stakeholders’.45 In 2011, 
ICOM and the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization developed a special mediation process for art and cultural heritage 
disputes. The International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)  has also 
contributed to the making, monitoring and implementation of international cultural 
instruments.46 ICOMOS has adopted many instruments on the protection of 
monuments.47 In parallel, as one of the advisory bodies to the World Heritage 
Committee—the committee responsible for the implementation of the World 
Heritage Convention—ICOMOS also evaluates the cultural and mixed properties 
proposed for listing and prepares reports on their state of conservation.48  
 
Private actors have also contributed to the implementation and enforcement of 
international cultural law. Private actors often file claims against state organs for the 
recovery of cultural property looted in times of war, or for the violation of their 
cultural entitlements. In doing so, non-state actors have played an important role in 
the emergence of the lex culturalis, a collection of rules and principles requiring the 
return of stolen cultural goods.49 For example, in the Altmann case, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the government of Austria could not enjoy 
sovereign immunity in relation to a civil action brought by Maria Altmann before US 
Courts for the return of Klimt’s paintings, which Austria had obtained as a 
consequence of Nazi persecution of Austrian Jews.50 Maria Altmann was the niece of 
Adele Bloch-Bauer, a wealthy Jewish patron of the arts, who served as the model for 
some of Klimt’s best-known paintings, and who hosted a renowned Viennese salon 
that regularly attracted the most prominent artists of the day. The parties in this case 
agreed to arbitrate their dispute, and the award resulting from the arbitration 
required Austria to return the paintings to the claimant. Altmann subsequently 
consigned the Klimt paintings to Christie’s auction house to be sold on behalf of her 
family. The painting ‘Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I’ (1907) was sold to a private 
collector, Ronald Lauder, and since its sale has been on public display in the Neue 
Galerie in New York City. This is only one example of the many cases which have 
centered on the return of cultural goods.  
 
Private actors may also influence the arena of international cultural law by helping to 
locate and recover underwater cultural heritage. In recent years, the advancement of 
technology has made it possible to find, visit and remove artefacts from shipwrecks 
that have been remained untouched in the abyss for centuries. The increasing 
capability to reach these archaeological treasures has intensified the debate on 
management issues. Non-state actors file admiralty claims for establishing their title 
to sunken vessels, on which in turn, states may claim public property and sovereign 
                                                 
45 ICOM, ICOM’s International Observatory on Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods, available at 
http://icom.museum/programmes/fighting-illicit-traffic/icoms-international-observatory-on-illicit-
traffic-in-cultural-goods/ (last visited on 11 October 2016). 
46 ICOMOS is a non-governmental international organization dedicated to the conservation of the 
world’s monuments and sites. Based in Paris, it was founded in 1965.  
47 See e.g. the Florence Charter 1981 on Historic Gardens, adopted by ICOMOS as an addendum to 
the Venice Charter in December 1982, available at 
http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/gardens_e.pdf (Accessed 11 October 2016).  
48 Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, WHC 13/01, 
2013, paras. 30–1, 34–5, 143–151. 
49 See generally Alessandro Chechi, The Settlement of International Cultural Heritage Disputes (OUP 2014). 




immunity.51 While private actors have claimed possession rights under the law of 
salvage and sold the artefacts, the scientific community and the public at large are 
often interested in and demand the preservation of such cultural heritage. At the 
same time, states lack the resources to locate and recover this type of heritage, and 
the contribution of non-state actors is likely necessary to find these kinds of artefacts 
in the first place.  
 
When non-state actors file claims against states or submit friend-of-the-court briefs 
before domestic, regional and international jurisdictions,52 the cultural interests at 
stake may present a complexity that is distinct among other areas of the law. Such 
cases engage a mixture of private and public interests, which at times coincide (e.g., 
when both require the protection of the cultural item), and at other times conflict 




3.    Exploring the Borderlands of International Cultural Law  
 
Non-state actors clearly play an increasingly important role in the creation, 
implementation, and enforcement of international cultural law, which can present 
both a destructive or positive force. It is therefore critical to consider the many 
implications of the expanding role of non-state actors in international cultural law. 
This section addresses this high-level question in relation to five key areas of global 
cultural governance: 1) democracy; 2) effectiveness; 3) humanisation; 4) risk of 
politicisation; and 5) the linkage issue. 
 
First, the contribution of non-state actors to the making of international cultural law 
raises questions as to the representativeness of the law. It remains unclear whether 
international cultural law is truly a democratic system expressing the voices of 
multiple constituencies, including both states and non-state actors. For example, 
global cultural governance tends to favour experts over non-experts; the relevant 
epistemic communities and networks largely consist of technocrats, professionals, 
and specialists. Under global cultural governance, decision-making processes 
therefore tend to be elitist and opaque, and express top-down approaches. Such 
approaches may not necessarily be responsive to local needs. However, this is not to 
say that international cultural law is an undemocratic system or that it is not 
becoming more and more polyphonic. On the one hand, the firm state-centric 
nature of international cultural law would maintain its relative conformity with other 
branches of international law. On the other hand, UNESCO law can be seen as an 
expression of indirect democracy. Populations select their governments, which then 
represent their respective states’ interests before international fora. Moreover, as 
previously noted, non-state actors have increasingly enacted soft law instruments 
and/or participated in the making of international cultural law. 
 
Second, the contribution of non-state actors to the implementation and enforcement 
of international cultural law raises questions about the effectiveness of the latter. 
Most international cultural law instruments have a ‘soft’ character and are not 
                                                 
51 See e.g. Valentina Vadi, ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage and the Market: The Uncertain Fate of 
Historic Sunken Warships under International Law’, in Valentina Vadi and Hildegard Schneider (eds.) 
Art, Cultural Heritage and the Market: Ethical and Legal Issues (Springer, 2014) 221–256. 
52 Chechi, ‘Non-State Actors and Cultural Heritage: Friends or Foes?’, 461. 
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binding. Even those international cultural law instruments that have a binding 
character often explicitly lack supremacy vis-à-vis other international treaties. They 
often include obligations of means rather than results. Therefore, states have a wide 
margin regarding how to implement their obligations under these instruments. This 
flexibility can be a positive aspect of global cultural governance, as it enables states 
to strike the appropriate balance between different interests.  
 
Third, an excessive emphasis on the protection of cultural heritage without sufficient 
input of the relevant stakeholders risks overprotecting heritage vis-à-vis other 
fundamental human needs and values.53 Anthropologists have discussed the risks of 
heritagisation processes, whereby items of heritage are overprotected irrespective of 
the impact of such overprotection on local communities’ needs. While respect of 
human rights is built into UNESCO treaties in theory, in practice there has been 
scarce community engagement, which has produced significant repercussions in the 
implementation of international cultural law.  
 
In Egypt, the vernacular architecture of the village of Gurna has been destroyed for 
‘preserving the authorized, more highly valued heritage’ in Luxor.54 In Kenya, 
indigenous communities have been evicted from their ancestral land, because the 
state prioritized protecting a world heritage site.55 In Tanzania, the reported failure to 
involve local ethnic groups and to support their religious and spiritual connection 
with the Mongomi Wa Kolo Rock Paintings World Heritage Site has caused their 
exclusion from the management of the site.56 In China, more than 20,000 residents 
of Pingyao, an exceptionally well-preserved ancient city and a World Heritage Site, 
were relocated in order to purportedly protect the cultural site.57 Once transformed 
into a World Heritage Site, the town has been ‘frozen in time, and the daily lives of 
[its] local residents were forever changed.’58 Meanwhile, in Angkor, Cambodia, 
another World Heritage Site, ‘local villagers have been excluded from the site or 
marginalized by various authorities in the name of conservation and tourism 
promotion’.59 In short, top-down approaches in policy-making risk overprotecting 
heritage vis-à-vis other human needs.  
 
It is important to consider why international law protects heritage, whether it is 
because of its historical nature, or because of its importance to humankind. In other 
words, international law can conserve heritage as a ‘frozen idealized past’, or 
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Philosophy (OUP 2002). 
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66 South African Archaeological Bulletin 60, 62. 
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conserve it ‘for the people’.60 Cultural heritage ‘is inextricably intertwined with its … 
social, cultural and economic context’.61 Therefore, not only the tangible aspects of 
heritage, but also its intangible values should be considered in the conservation of 
cultural heritage.62 Acknowledging ‘the social dynamics of heritage’ and ‘the 
interaction between people and their heritage’ enables ‘synergies between modern 
science and local knowledge’, between tangible and intangible heritage     and 
between local and universal values in the conservation of cultural heritage.63 It is on 
the basis of these principles that human rights bodies have condemned the forced 
eviction of local communities from heritage sites and emphasised the need to 
humanise cultural heritage law. 
 
Fourth, politics lies at the heart of any heritage policy. The interest of locals and that 
of the international community often coincide, as both local and international 
communities have an interest in the conservation of cultural heritage sites. However, 
when interests collide, national authorities (and adjudicators) face the dilemma of 
whether to comply with international cultural law or to fulfil their mandate according 
to the preferences of their constituencies. For example, the Elbe Valley—a former 
world heritage site located in Germany—was removed from the World Heritage List 
after local authorities decided to approve a project to build a four-lane bridge. In 
other cases, the reaction of UNESCO has been milder, even in the presence of 
larger-scale damage and destruction. For example, the Bamiyan Valley was inscribed 
on the World Heritage List after the destruction of the Buddhas by the Taliban.  
 
Finally, the lack of dedicated courts and tribunals can be problematic for 
international cultural law. As cultural heritage-related disputes often lie at the heart 
of state sovereignty, states have not been able to agree on establishing dedicated 
international courts and tribunals. This gap results in a form of ‘diaspora’ of cultural 
heritage-related disputes before alternative courts and tribunals, which may lack the 
mandate to adjudicate on the violation of cultural heritage law. The magnetism of 
other fora prompts the question of whether cultural heritage can receive adequate 
consideration in adjudication before fora that are not designed for such disputes. 
While some overlapping is inevitable among various areas of international law, it is 
important to examine and identify what steps should be taken to ensure mutual 
supportiveness between different treaty regimes. With the notable exception of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which has the mandate to adjudicate on the 
damages and/or destruction of cultural sites under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC 
Statute, other courts and tribunals do not have the mandate to adjudicate on the 
eventual violation of cultural heritage law, which has led to the emergence of 
interesting cases in which important cultural issues were mentioned in passing 
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4. Rethinking Cultural Governance  
 
The emerging debate surrounding the role of non-state actors in international 
cultural law has certainly ‘shed new light on the dynamics of international law-
making and international law enforcement, which have long been underestimated in 
a state-centric normative system.’65 Not only can non-state actors participate in the 
production of international law instruments and soft law standards, but they also 
play a central role in the monitoring and enforcement of international cultural law.66 
At the same time, the expanding role of non-state actors also suggests a need to 
significantly rethink the enforcement mechanisms of international cultural law. 
 
First, the importance of the protection of cultural heritage to individuals, 
communities, nations and the international community as a whole suggests that 
policy makers should consider introducing ad hoc provisions even in non-cultural 
international instruments. This would help in defragmenting international law, and in 
overcoming the risk that international cultural law could be perceived as a self-
contained regime. Even in the absence of such ad hoc provisions, de lege lata, 
international cultural law is a part of international law to be construed in accordance 
with the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation as indicated in articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT.  
 
Second, the democratisation of international cultural law is bringing certain non-state 
actors’ claims from the former ‘periphery’ to the centre of the legal debate.67 Non-
state entities, such as individuals and groups (e.g., indigenous peoples, NGOs) used 
to be mere ‘objects’ of international law ‘on the periphery of the international legal 
order’, but are now increasingly playing an active role in international relations.68  
 
Third, the debate on the role of non-state actors contributes to the humanisation of 
international law, making it more porous to other interests and needs which go 
beyond the reason of state (raison d’état) and acknowledge the respect for human 
dignity and fundamental human rights. Cultural heritage objects are not just objects. 
They can tell us different narratives depending on the perspective one adopts; they 
embody different meanings to different audiences. Policy makers and adjudicators 
should capture these different values.  
 
Fourth, the debate regarding non-state actors contributes to counteracting 
heritigisation processes within international cultural law, which emphasise the 
protection of heritage because of its intrinsic features (‘heritage is heritage’). The 
discussion of the expanding role of non-state actors contextualises heritage within a 
broader framework—that of the local and international communities. In other 
words, cultural objects are viewed against the background of human history. 
Heritage is not an abstract value; rather, it matters to a variety of actors who attach 
different narratives to the same objects. In short, the debate on the role of non-state 
actors ultimately highlights the human dimension of international cultural law.69 
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Fifth, the debate about the role of individuals in international cultural law 
contributes to the consolidation of cultural rights in the human rights pantheon. 
While cultural rights have been marginalised historically vis-à-vis civil and political 
rights, they have recently undergone a renaissance—as shown by the vast number of 
related studies published in the past decade. Access to cultural heritage can be 
instrumental to the enjoyment of cultural rights. Although a right to cultural heritage 
does not yet exist in the human rights pantheon, rights relating to cultural heritage 
are arguably inherent in cultural rights. For example, the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro 
Convention) recognises that ‘every person has a right to engage [in] the cultural 
heritage of their choice, while respecting the rights and freedoms of others, as an 
aspect of the right to participate freely in cultural life’.70 The protection of cultural 
heritage is clearly connected to other human rights, including self-determination, 
freedom of expression and religious freedoms, among others. A human rights-based 
approach to cultural heritage centres on the human dimension of heritage discourse, 
expressing ‘the need to put people and human values at the centre of an enlarged 
and cross-disciplinary concept of cultural heritage’.71 As the UN Independent Expert 
on Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed, articulated,  
 
‘Beyond preserving/safeguarding an object . . . in itself, [such an 
approach] obliges one to take into account the rights of individuals and 
communities in relation to such objects . . . and, in particular, to connect 
cultural heritage with its source of production. Cultural heritage is linked 
to human dignity and identity. Accessing and enjoying cultural heritage 
is an important feature of being a member of the human society’.72 
 
Finally, the debate on the expanding role of non-state actors in international cultural 
law allows for reflection on the meaning of justice and whether the existing legal 
framework enables access to justice and to effective remedies. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)73 requires adjudicators to settle disputes 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’.74 This will have to 





Non-state actors are in many ways the core of international cultural law. Their 
actions can elicit the goals and strengths of international cultural law, but can also 
reveal and confront the limits of the field. It is critical to dissect and understand the 
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expanding role of non-state actors in order to determine the appropriate response by 
international cultural law. 
 
On the one hand, the participation of private actors can spur the evolution and 
progress of international cultural law in conformity with public international law. 
Such actors can play a positive role in the development of international cultural law, 
contributing to rule-making and to the conservation and safeguarding of heritage. 
On the other hand, there is a ‘hegemonic discourse about heritage’ that ‘undermines 
alternative … ideas about heritage’.75 The discourse about and management of 
heritage has become the ‘near-exclusive domain of experts’, separated from the 
traditional heritage holders.76 At the same time, political, religious and economic 
iconoclasm by non-state actors can provoke the damage to or destruction of 
valuable cultural heritage. Such actions highlight the urgent need to rethink the field 
and build bridges across different fields of international law. The emerging role of 
non-state actors requires particular reconsideration of the available dispute 
settlement and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the linkage issue. 
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